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THE ORIGINS OF ARYAN
SPEECH
INTRODUCTORY
Among all the many promising beginnings of
which the nineteenth century was the witness, none perhaps was hailed
with greater eagerness by the world of culture and science
than the triumphant debut of Comparative Philology. None
perhaps has been more disappointing in its results. The philologists indeed place a high value on their line of study, — nor
is that to be wondered at, in spite of all its defects, — and persist in giving it the name of Science; but the scientists are of a
very different opinion. In Germany, in the very metropolis both
of Science and of philology, the word philology has become a
term of disparagement; nor are the philologists in a position to
retort. Physical Science has proceeded by the soundest and most
scrupulous methods and produced a mass of indisputable results
which, by their magnitude and far-reaching consequences, have
revolutionised the world and justly entitled the age of their development to the title of the wonderful century. Comparative
Philology has hardly moved a step beyond its origins; all the rest
has been a mass of conjectural and ingenious learning of which
the brilliance is only equalled by the uncertainty and unsound-
ness. Even so great a philologist as Renan was obliged in the
later part of his career, begun with such unlimited hopes, to a
deprecating apology for the "little conjectural sciences" to which
he had devoted his life's energies. At the beginning of the
century's philological researches, when the Sanskrit tongue had
been discovered, when Max Müller was exulting in his fatal
formula, "pitā, patēr, pater, voter, father", the Science of Language seemed to be on the point of self-revelation; as the result
of the century's toil it can be asserted by thinkers of repute that
the very idea of a Science of Language is a chimera! No doubt,
the case against Comparative Philology has been overstated.
If it has not discovered the Science of Language, it has at least
swept out of existence the fantastic, arbitrary and almost lawless
Etymology of our forefathers. It has given us juster notions about
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the relations and history of extant languages and the processes
by which old tongues have degenerated into that detritus out of
which a new form of speech fashions itself. Above all, it has
given us the firmly established notion that our investigations into language
must be a search for rules and laws and not free and untrammelled gambollings among individual derivations. The
way has been prepared; many difficulties have been cleared out
of our way. Still scientific philology is non-existent; much less
has there been any real approach to the discovery of the Science
of Language.
Does it follow that a Science of Language is undiscoverable ?
In India, at least, with its great psychological systems mounting
to the remotest prehistoric antiquity, we cannot easily believe
that regular and systematic processes of Nature are not at the
basis of all phenomena of sound and speech. European philology has missed the
road to the truth because an excessive enthusiasm and eager haste to catch at and exaggerate imperfect,
subordinate and often misleading formulae has involved it in
bypaths that lead to no resting-place; but somewhere the road
exists. If it exists, it can be found. The right clue alone is wanted
and a freedom of mind which can pursue it unencumbered by
prepossessions and undeterred by the orthodoxies of the learned.
Above all if the science of philology is to cease to figure among
the petty conjectural sciences, among which even Renan was
compelled to classify it, — and conjectural science means pseudo-science, since fixed, sound and verifiable bases and methods
independent of conjecture are the primary condition of Science,
— then the habit of hasty generalisation, of light and presumptuous inferences, of the chase after mere ingenuities and the
satisfaction of curious and learned speculation which are the
pitfalls of verbal scholarship must be rigidly eschewed and re-
legated to the waste paper basket of humanity, counted among
its necessary toys which, having now issued out of the nursery, we
should put away into their appropriate lumber-room. Where
there is insufficient evidence or equal probability in conflicting
solutions, Science admits conjectural hypotheses as a step towards
discovery. But the abuse of this concession to our human ignorance, the habit of erecting flimsy conjectures as the assured gains
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of knowledge is the curse of philology. A Science which is nine-tenths conjecture has no right at this stage of the human march,
to make much of itself or seek to impose itself on the mind of
the race. Its right attitude is humility, its chief business to seek
always for surer foundations and a better justification for its
existence.
To seek for such a stronger and surer
foundation is the object of this work. In order that the attempt may succeed, it is
necessary first to perceive the errors committed in the past and to
eschew them. The first error committed by the philologists after
their momentous discovery of the Sanskrit tongue, was to
exaggerate the importance of their first superficial discoveries.
The first glance is apt to be superficial; the perceptions drawn
from an initial survey stand always in need of correction. If then
we are so dazzled and led away by them as to make them the
very key of our future knowledge, its central plank, its basic plat- form we
prepare for ourselves grievous disappointments. Comparative Philology, guilty of this error, has seized on a minor
clue and mistaken it for a major or chief clue. When Max Müller
trumpeted forth to the world in his attractive studies the great
rapprochement, pitā, patēr, pater, voter, father, he was preparing
the bankruptcy of the new science; he was leading it away from
the truer clues, the wider vistas that lay behind. The most extra-
ordinary and imposingly unsubstantial structures were reared on
the narrow basis of that unfortunate formula. First, there was
the elaborate division of civilised humanity into the Aryan,
Semitic, Dravidian and Turanean races, based upon the philological classification of the ancient and modern languages. More
sensible and careful reflection has shown us that community of
language is no proof of community of blood or ethnological
identity; the French are not a Latin race because they speak a
corrupt and nasalised Latin, nor the Bulgars Slavs in blood because the Ugro-Finnish races have been wholly Slavonicised in
civilisation and language. Scientific researches of another kind
have confirmed this useful and timely negation. The philologists
have, for instance, split up, on the strength of linguistic differences, the Indian nationality into the northern Aryan race and
the southern Dravidian, but sound observation shows a single
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physical type with minor variations pervading the whole of
India from Cape Comorin to Afghanistan. Language is there-
fore discredited as an ethnological factor. The races of India
may be all pure Dravidians, if indeed such an entity as a Dravidian race exists or ever existed, or they may be pure Aryans, if
indeed such an entity as an Aryan race exists or ever existed, or
they may be a mixed race with one predominant strain, but in
any case the linguistic division of the tongues of India into the
Sanskritic and the Tamilic counts for nothing in that problem.
Yet so great is the force of attractive generalisations and widely
popularised errors that all the world goes on perpetuating the
blunder talking of the Indo-European races, claiming or disclaiming Aryan kinship and building on that basis of falsehood
the most far-reaching political, social or pseudo-scientific conclusions.
But if language is no sound factor of ethnological research,
it may be put forward as a proof of common civilisation and used
as a useful and reliable guide to the phenomena of early civilisations. Enormous, most ingenious, most painstaking have been
the efforts to extract from the meanings of words a picture of the
early Aryan civilisation previous to the dispersion of their tribes,
Vedic scholarship has built upon this conjectural science of philology, upon a
brilliantly ingenious and attractive but wholly conjectural and unreliable interpretation of the Vedas, a remarkable,
minute and captivating picture of an early half-savage Aryan
civilisation in India. How much value can we attach to these
dazzling structures? None, for they have no assured scientific
basis. They may be true and last, they may be partly true yet
have to be seriously modified, they may be entirely false and no
trace of them be left in the ultimate conclusion of human know-
ledge on the subject; we have no means of determining between
these three possibilities. The now settled rendering of Veda
which reigns hitherto because it has never been critically and
minutely examined, is sure before long to be powerfully at-
tacked and questioned. One thing may be confidently expected
that even if India was ever invaded, colonised or civilised by northern
worshippers of Sun and Fire, yet the picture of that invasion richly painted by philological scholarship from the Rig-veda
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will prove to be a modern legend and not ancient history,
and even if a half-savage Aryan civilisation existed in India in
early times, the astonishingly elaborate modern descriptions
of Vedic India will turn out a philological mirage and phantasmagoria. The wider question of an early Aryan civilisation must
equally be postponed, till we have sounder materials. The present
theory is wholly illusory; for it assumes that common terms
imply a common civilisation, an assumption which sins both by
excess and by defect. It sins by excess; it cannot be argued, for
instance, that because the Romans and Indians have a common
term for a particular utensil, therefore that utensil was possessed
by their ancestors in common previous to their separation.
We must know first the history of the contact between the
ancestors of the two races; we must be sure that the extant
Roman word did not replace an original Latin term not possessed by the Indians;
we must be sure that the Romans did not receive the term by transmission from Greek or Celt without ever
having had any identity, connection or contact with our Aryan
forefathers; we must be proof against many other possible solutions about which philology can give us no guarantee either
negative or affirmative. The Indian suranga, a tunnel, is supposed
to be the Greek surinx. We cannot, therefore, argue that the
Greeks and Indians possessed the common art of tunnel-making
before their dispersion or even that the Indians who borrowed
the word from Greece, never knew what an underground excavation might be till they learned it from Macedonian engineers.
The Bengali term for telescope is durbīn, a word not of European,
origin. We cannot conclude that the Bengalis had invented the
telescope independently before their contact with the Europeans.
Yet on the principles by which the philologists seem to be guided
in their conjectural restorations of vanished cultures, these are
precisely the conclusions at which we should arrive. Here we have a knowledge of
the historical facts to correct our speculations ; but the prehistoric ages are not similarly defended. Historical data are entirely wanting and we are left at the mercy of
words and their misleading indications. But a little reflection on
the vicissitudes of languages and specially some study of the
peculiar linguistic phenomena created in India by the impact of
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the English tongue on our literary vernaculars, the first rush with
which English words attempted to oust, in conversation and
letter-writing, even common indigenous terms in their own
favour and the reaction by which the vernaculars are now finding
new Sanskritic terms to express the novel concepts introduced by
the Europeans, will be sufficient to convince any thoughtful mind
how rash are the premises of these philological culture-restorers
and how excessive and precarious their conclusions. Nor do
they sin by excess alone, but by defect also. They consistently
ignore the patent fact that in prehistoric and preliterary times
the vocabularies of primitive languages must have varied from
century to century to an extent of which we with our ideas of
language drawn from the classical and modern literary tongues
can form little conception. It is, I believe, an established fact of
anthropology that many savage tongues change their vocabulary
almost from generation to generation. It is, therefore, perfectly
possible that the implements of civilisation and culture ideas for
which no two Aryan tongues have a common term may yet have
been common property before their dispersion; since each of them may have
rejected after that dispersion the original common term for a neologism of its own manufacture. It is the
preservation of common terms and not their disappearance that
is the miracle of language.
I exclude, therefore, and exclude rightly from the domain
of philology as I conceive it all ethnological conclusions, all inferences from words to the culture and civilisation of the men or
races who used them, however alluring may be those speculations, however attractive, interesting and probable may be the
inferences which we are tempted to draw in the course of our
study. The philologist has nothing to do with ethnology. The
philologist has nothing to do with sociology, anthropology and
archaeology. His sole business is or ought to be with the history
of words and of the association of ideas with the sound forms which they
represent. By strictly confining himself to this province, by the self-denial with which he eschews all irrelevent
distractions and delights on his somewhat dry and dusty road,
he will increase his concentration on his own proper work
and avoid lures which may draw him away from the great discoveries
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awaiting mankind on this
badly explored tract of knowledge.
But the affinities of languages to each other are, at least, a
proper field for the labours of philology. Nevertheless, even here
I am compelled to hold that the scholarship of Europe has fallen
into an error in giving this subject of study the first standing
among the objects of philology. Are we really quite sure that we
know what constitutes community or diversity of origin between
two different languages — so different, for instance, as Latin
and Sanskrit, Sanskrit and Tamil, Tamil and Latin? Latin,
Greek and Sanskrit are supposed to be sister Aryan tongues,
Tamil is set apart as of other and Dravidian origin. If we enquire
on what foundation this distinct and contrary treatment rests,
we shall find that community of origin is supposed on two main
grounds, a common body of ordinary and familiar terms and a
considerable community of grammatical forms and uses. We
come back to the initial formula, pitā, patēr, pater, voter, father.
What other test, it may be asked, can be found for determining linguistic
kinship ? Possibly none, but a little dispassionate consideration will give us, it seems to me, ground to pause and reflect
very long and seriously before we classify languages too confidently upon this slender basis. The mere possession of a large
body of common terms is, it is recognised, insufficient to establish kinship; it may establish nothing more than contact or co-
habitation. Tamil has a very large body of Sanskrit words in
its rich vocabulary, but it is not therefore a Sanskritic language.
The common terms must be those which express ordinary and
familiar ideas and objects, such as domestic relations, numerals,
pronouns, the heavenly bodies, the ideas of being, having, etc.,
— those terms that are most commonly in the mouths of men,
especially of primitive men, and are, therefore, shall we say, least
liable to variation? Sanskrit says addressing the father, pitar,
Greek patēr, Latin pater, but Tamil says appā; Sanskrit says
addressing the mother mātar, Greek mēter, Latin mater, but
Tamil ammā; for the numeral seven Sanskrit says saptan or sapta,
Greek hepta, Latin septa, but Tamil eḷ̣u; for the first
person Sanskrit says aham, Greek egō or egōn, Latin ego, but Tamil
nān; for
the sun, Sanskrit says sūra or sūrya, Greek helios, Latin sol, but
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Tamil ñāyir; for the idea of being, Sanskrit has as, asmi, Greek
has einai and eimi, Latin esse and sum, but Tamil iru. The basis
of differentiation, then, appears with a striking clearness. There
is no doubt about it. Sanskrit, Greek and Latin belong to one
linguistic family which we may call conveniently the Aryan or
Indo-European, Tamil to another for which we can get no more
convenient term than Dravidian.
So far, good. We seem to be standing on a firm foundation,
to be in possession of a rule which can be applied with some-
thing like scientific accuracy. But when we go a little farther, the
fair prospect clouds a little, mists of doubt begin to creep into our
field of vision. Mother and father we have; but there are other
domestic relations. Over the daughter of the house, the primaeval milk-maid, the Aryan sisters show the slight beginnings
of a spirit of disagreement. The Sanskrit father addresses her in
the orthodox fashion, duhitar, O milkmaid; Greek as well as
German and English parents follow suit with thugather, tochter,
and daughter, but Latin has abandoned its pastoral ideas, knows
nothing of duhitā and uses a word filia which has no conceivable
connection with the milk-pail and is not connected with any
variant for daughter in the kindred tongues. Was Latin then a
mixed tongue drawing from a non-Aryan stock for its conception of daughterhood ? But this is only a single and negligible
variation. We go farther and find, when we come to the word
for son, these Aryan languages seem to differ hopelessly and give
up all appearance of unity. Sanskrit says putra, Greek huios,
Latin films, the three languages use three words void of all mutual connection. We cannot indeed arrive at the conclusion that
these languages were Aryan in their conception of fatherhood
and motherhood, but sonhood is a Dravidian conception, —
like architecture, monism and most other civilised conceptions,
according to some modern authorities; for Sanskrit has a literary
term for child or son, sūnuḥ, with which we can connect the
German sohn, English son and more remotely the Greek huios.
We explain the difference then by supposing that these languages
did possess an original common term for son, possibly sunū,
which was dropped by many of them at least in a colloquial
expression, Sanskrit relegated it to the language of high literature,
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Greek adopted another form from the same root, Latin
lost it altogether and substituted for it films as it has substituted
filia for duhitā. This sort of fluidity in the commonest terms
seems to have been common — Greek has lost its original word
for brother, phrator, which its sisters retain, and substituted
adelphos, for which they have no correspondents, Sanskrit has
abandoned the common word for the numeral one unus, ein,
one and substituted a word eka, unknown to any other Aryan
tongue; all differ over the third personal pronoun; for moon
Greek has selene, Latin luna, Sanskrit candra. But when we admit
these facts, a very important part of our scientific basis is sapped
and the edifice begins to totter. For we come back to this fatal
fact that even in the commonest terms the ancient languages
tended to lose their original vocabulary and diverge from each
other so that if the process had not been arrested by an early
literature all obvious proof of relationship might well have disappeared. It is only the accident of an early and continuous
Sanskrit literature that enables us to establish the original unity
of the Aryan tongues. If it were not for the old Sanskrit writings,
if only the ordinary Sanskrit colloquial vocables had survived who could be
certain of these connections? or who could confidently affiliate colloquial
Bengali with its ordinary domestic terms to Latin any more certainly than Telugu
or Tamil? How then are we to be sure that the dissonance of Tamil itself with
the Aryan tongues is not due to an early separation and an extensive change of its vocabulary during its preliterary ages?
I shall be able, at a later stage of this inquiry to afford some
ground for supposing the Tamil numerals to be early Aryan
vocables abandoned by Sanskrit but still traceable in the Veda or scattered and
imbedded in the various Aryan tongues and the Tamil pronouns similarly the
primitive Aryan denominatives of which traces still remain in the ancient
tongues. I shall be able to show also that large families of words supposed to
be pure Tamil are identical in the mass, though not in their units, with the
Aryan family. But then we are logically driven towards this conclusion that
absence of a common vocabulary for common ideas and objects is not necessarily a proof of diverse origin.
Diversity of grammatical forms? But are we certain that the
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Tamil forms are not equally old Aryan forms, corrupted but
preserved by the early deliquescence of the Tamilic dialect?
Some of them are common to the modern Aryan vernaculars,
but unknown to Sanskrit, and it has even been thence concluded
by some that the Aryan vernaculars were originally non-Aryan
tongues linguistically overpowered by the foreign invader. But
if so then into what quagmires of uncertainty do we not descend ?
Our shadow of a scientific basis, our fixed classification of language families have disappeared into shifting vestibules of nothingness.
Nor is this all the havoc that more mature consideration
works in the established theory of the philologists. We have
found a wide divergence between the Tamil common terms and
those shared in common by the "Aryan" dialects; but let us
look a little more closely into these divergences. The Tamil for
father is appā, not pitā; there is no corresponding word in
Sanskrit, but we have what one might call a reverse of the word
in apatyam, son, in aptyam, offspring and apna, offspring. These
three words point decisively to a Sanskrit root ap, to produce or
create, for which other evidence in abundance can be found.
What is there to prevent us from supposing appā, father, to be the
Tamil form for an old Aryan active derivative from this root
corresponding to the passive derivative apatyam7 Mother in
Tamil is ammā, not mātā; there is no Sanskrit word ammā, but
there is the well-known Sanskrit vocable ambā, mother. What is
to prevent us from understanding the Tamil ammā as an Aryan
form equivalent to ambā, derived from the root amb to produce,
which gives us amba and ambaka, father, ambā, ambikā and ambi,
mother and ambarīṣa, colt of a horse or the young of an animal.
Sodara, a high Sanskrit word, is the common colloquial term in
Tamil for brother and replaces the northern vernacular bhāi
and classical bhrātā. Akkā, a Sanskrit word with many variants,
is the colloquial term in Tamil for elder sister. In all these cases
an obsolete or high literary term in Sanskrit is the ordinary
colloquial term in Tamil, just as we see the high literary Sanskrit
sūnuḥ appearing in the colloquial German sohn and English
son, the obsolete and certainly high literary Aryan adalbha undivided, appearing in the colloquial Greek adelphos, brother.
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What are we to conclude from these and a host of other instances
which will appear in a later volume of this work ? That Tamil is
an Aryan dialect, like Greek, like German ? Surely not, — the
evidence is not sufficient; but that it is possible for a non-Aryan
tongue to substitute largely and freely Aryan vocables for its
most common and familiar terms and lose its own native expression. But then we are
again driven by inexorable logic to this conclusion that just as the absence of a common vocabulary for
common and domestic terms is not a sure proof of diverse origin,
so also the possession of an almost identical vocabulary for these
terms is not a sure proof of common origin. These things prove,
at the most, intimate contact or separate development; they do
not prove and in themselves cannot prove anything more. But
on what basis then are we to distinguish and classify various
language families? Can we positively say that Tamil is a non-
Aryan or Greek, Latin and German Aryan tongues ? From the
indication of grammatical forms and uses, from the general
impression created by the divergence or identity of the vocables
inherited by the languages we are comparing? But the first is
too scanty and inconclusive, the second too empirical, uncertain
and treacherous a test; both are the reverse of scientific, both, as
reflection will show, might lead us into the largest and most radical errors. Rather than to form a conclusion by such a principle
it is better to abstain from all conclusions and turn to a more
thorough and profitable initial labour.
I conclude that it is too early, in the history of philological
research, we have made as yet too crude and slender a foundation
to rear upon it the superstructure of scientific laws and scientific
classifications. We cannot yet arrive at a sound and certain
classification of human tongues still extant in speech, record or
literature. We must recognise that our divisions are popular, not scientific,
based upon superficial identities, not upon the one sound foundation for a
science, the study of various species in their development from the embryo to
the finished form or, failing the necessary material, a reverse study tracing back the
finished forms to the embryonic and digging down into the
hidden original foetus of language. The reproach of the real
scientist against the petty conjectural pseudo-science of philology
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is just; it must be removed by the adoption
of a sounder method and greater self-restraint, the renunciation of brilliant
superficialities and a more scrupulous, sceptical and patient system of
research. In the present work I renounce, therefore, however
alluring the temptation, however strong the facts may seem to a
superficial study, all attempt to speculate on the identities or
relationships of the different languages, on the evidence of philology as to the character and history of primitive human civilisations, or any other subject whatever not strictly within the four
walls of my subject. That subject is the origin, growth and development of human language as it is shown to us by the embryology of the language ordinarily called Sanskrit and three ancient
tongues, two dead and one living which have evidently come at
least into contact with it, the Latin, Greek and Tamil. I have
called my work, for convenience's sake, 'The Origins of Aryan
Speech'; but I would have it clearly understood that by using this
familiar epithet I do not for a moment wish to imply any opinion
as to the relationship of the four languages included in my survey,
or the race origin of the peoples speaking them or even of the
ethnic origins of the Sanskrit speaking peoples. I did not wish to
use the word Sanskrit, both because it is only a term meaning
polished or correct and designating the literary tongue of ancient
India as distinct from the vernaculars used by the women and the
common people and because my scope is somewhat wider than
the classical tongue of the northern Hindus. I base my conclusions on the evidence of the Sanskrit language helped out by those
parts of the Greek, Latin and Tamil tongues which are cognate
to the word-families of Sanskrit, and by the origins of Aryan
speech I mean, properly, the origin of human speech as used
and developed by those who fashioned these word-families and
their stocks and off-shoots. The significance of the word Aryan,
as I use it, goes no farther.
In such an enquiry, it is obvious that a kind of science of
linguistic embryology is the first necessity. In other words, it is
only in proportion as we get away from the habits and notions
and apparent facts of formed human speech in its use by modern
and civilised people, only in proportion as we get nearer to the
first roots and rudiments of the structure of the more ancient
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and primitive languages that we shall have any chance of making
really fruitful discoveries. Just as from the study of the formed
outward man, animal, plant, the great truths of evolution could
not be discovered or, if discovered, not firmly fixed, —just as
only by going back from the formed creature to its skeleton and
from the skeleton to the embryo could the great truth be established that in matter also the great Vedantic formula holds good,
— of a world formed by the development of many forms from
one seed, in the will of the universal Being, ekam bījam bahudhā
yaḥ. karoti, so also in language; if the origin and unity of human
speech can be found and established, if it can be shown that its
development was governed by fixed laws and processes, it is only
by going back to its earliest forms that the discovery is to be
made and its proofs established. Modern speech is largely a
fixed and almost artificial form, not precisely a fossil, but an
organism proceeding towards arrest and fossilisation. The ideas
its study suggests to us are well calculated to lead us entirely
astray. In modern language the word is a fixed conventional
symbol having for no good reason that we know a significance
we are bound by custom to attach to it. We mean by wolf a certain
kind of animal, but why we use this sound and not another to
mean it, except as a mere lawless fact of historical development,
we do not know, do not care to think. Any other sound would, for
us, be equally good for the purpose, provided the custom-bound
mentality prevailing in our environment could be persuaded to
sanction it. It is only when we go back to the early tongues and
find, for instance, that the Sanskrit word for wolf means radically "tearing" that we get a glimpse of one law at least of the
development of language. Again, in modern speech we have fixed
parts of speech; noun, adjective, verb, adverb are to us different
words even when their forms are the same. Only when we go
back to the earlier tongues do we get a glimpse of the striking,
the illuminating fact that in the most fundamental forms a single
monosyllable did service equally for noun, adjective, verb and
adverb and that man in his earliest use of speech probably made
in his mind little or no conscious difference between these various
uses. We see the word vṛka in modern Sanskrit used only as a
noun signifying wolf; in the Veda it means simply tearing or a
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tearer, is used indifferently as a noun or adjective, even in its
noun-use has much of the freedom of an adjective and can be
applied freely to a wolf, a demon, an enemy, a disruptive force
or anything that tears. We find in the Veda, although there are
adverbial forms corresponding to the Latin adverb in e and ter,
the adjective itself used continually as a pure adjective and yet in
a relation to the verb and its action which corresponds to our
modern use of adverbs and adverbial or prepositional phrases or
subordinate adverbial clauses. Still more remarkable, we find
nouns and adjectives used frequently as verbs with an object in
the accusative case depending on the verbal idea in the root. We
are prepared, therefore, to find that in the simplest and earliest
forms of the Aryan tongue the use of a word was quite fluid, that
a word like cit for instance might equally mean to know, knowing, knows, knower, knowledge, or knowingly and be used by the
speaker without any distinct idea of the particular employment
he was making of the pliant vocable. Again, the tendency to
fixity in modern tongues, the tendency to use words as mere
counters and symbols of ideas, not as living entities themselves
the parents of thought, creates a tendency to limit severely the use
of a single word in several different senses and also a tendency to
avoid the use of many different words for the expression of a
single object or idea. When we have got the word 'strike' to mean
a voluntary and organised cessation of work by labourers, we
are satisfied; we would be embarrassed if we had to choose
between this and fifteen other words equally common and having
the same significance; still more should we feel embarrassed if
the same word could mean a blow, a sunbeam, anger, death, life,
darkness, shelter, a house, food and prayer. Yet this is precisely
the phenomenon,—again, I suggest a most striking and illuminating phenomenon, — we find in the early history of speech.
Even in later Sanskrit the wealth of apparently unconnected
significances borne by a single word is phenomenal, but in Vedic
Sanskrit it is more than phenomenal and offers a serious stumbling-block to any attempt by moderns to fix the exact and in-
disputable sense of the Aryan hymns. I shall give evidence in
this work for concluding that in yet earlier speech the licence was
much greater, that each word, not only exceptionally but ordinarily,
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was capable of numerous different meanings and each
object or idea could be expressed by many, often by as many
as fifty different words each derived from a different root. To
our ideas such a state of things would be one merely of lawless
confusion negativing the very idea of any law of speech or any possibility of a
linguistic Science, but I shall show that this extraordinary freedom and pliancy arose inevitably out of the very
nature of human speech in its beginnings and as a result of the
very laws which presided over its pristine development.
By going back thus from the artificial use of a developed
speech in modern language nearer to the natural use of primitive
speech by our earlier forefathers we gain two important points.
We get rid of the idea of a conventional fixed connection between
the sound and its sense and we perceive that a certain object is
expressed by a certain sound because for some reason it suggested
a particular and striking action or characteristic which distinguished that object to the earlier human mind. Ancient man did
not say in his mind as would the sophisticated modern, "Here is
a gory carnivorous animal, with four legs, of the canine species
who hunts in packs and is particularly associated in my mind
with Russia and the winter and snow and the steppes; let us find
a suitable name for him"; he had fewer ideas about the wolf in
his mind, no preoccupation with ideas of scientific classification
and much preoccupation with the physical fact of his contact with
the wolf. It was this chief all-important physical fact he selected
when he cried to his companion, not "here is the wolf", but
simply "this tearer", ayam vrkah The question remains, why
the word vrkah more than another suggested the idea of tearing.
The Sanskrit language carries us one step back, but not yet to
the final step, by showing us that it is not the formed word vṛkaḥ
with which we have to deal, but the word vṛc, that root of which
vṛka is only one of several outgrowths. For the second obsession
it helps us to get rid of is the modern connection of the developed
word with some precise shade of an idea that we have accustomed
it to convey. The word delimitation and the complex sense it
conveys are with us welded together; we need not remember
that it comes from limes, a boundary, and that the single syllable
lime, which is the backbone of the word, does not carry to us by
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–565
itself the fundamental core of the
sense. But I think it can be
shown that even in the Vedic times men using the word vṛka
had the sense of the root vṛc foremost in their minds and it was
that root which to their mentality was the rigid fixed significant
part of speech; the full word being still fluid and depending for
its use on the associations wakened by the root it contained. If
that be so, we can partly see why words remained fluid in their
sense, varying according to the particular idea wakened by the
root-sound in the mentality of the speaker. We can see also
why this root itself was fluid not only in its significances, but in
its use and why even in the formed and developed word the
nominal, adjectival, verbal and adverbial uses were, even in the
comparatively late stage of speech we find in the Vedas, so imperfectly distinguished, so little rigid and separate, so much run
into each other. We get back always to the root as the determining unit of language. In the particular inquiry we have
before us, the basis for a science of language, we make a most
important advance. We need not enquire why vṛka meant tearer;
we shall enquire instead what the sound
vṛc meant to the early
Aryan-speaking races and why it bore the particular significance
or significances we actually find imbedded in it. We have not to
ask why dolabra in Latin means an axe, dalmi in Sanskrit means
Indra's thunderbolt, dalapa and dala are applied to weapons, or
dalanam meaning crushing or delphi in Greek is the name given
to a place of caverns and ravines, but we may confine ourselves
to an enquiry into the nature of the mother-root dal of which all
these different but cognate uses are the result. Not that the variations noted have no importance but their importance is minor
and subsidiary. We may indeed divide the history of speech-
origins into two parts, the embryonic into which research must
be immediate as of the first importance, the structural which is
less important and therefore may be kept for subsequent and
subsidiary inquiry. In the first we note the roots of speech and
inquire how vṛc came to mean to tear, dal to split or crush, whether arbitrarily or by the operation of some law of nature; in the
second we note the modifications and additions by which those
roots grow into developed words, word-groups, word-families
and word-clans and why those modifications and additions had
Page
–566
the effect on sense and use which we
find them to have exercised,
why the termination ana turns dal into an adjective or a noun
and what is the source and sense of the various terminations
ābra, bhi, bha, (del)phoi, (dal)bhāh, ān (Greek ōn) and ana.
This superior importance of the root in
early language to
the formed word is one of those submerged facts of language the
neglect of which has been one of the chief causes of philology's
scientific abortiveness as a science. The first comparative philologists made, it seems to me, a fatal mistake when, misled by the
wider preoccupation with the formed word, they fixed on the
correlation pitā, patēr, pater, voter, father as the clef, or the
mūlamantra, of their science and began to argue from it to all
sorts of sound or unsound conclusions. The real clef, the real
correlation is to be found in this other agreement, dalbhi, dalana,
dolabra, dolon,¹ delphi, leading to the idea of a common mother-
root, common word-families, common word-clans, kindred
word-nations, or, as we call them, languages. And if it had been
also noticed that in all these languages dal means also pretence
or fraud and has other common or kindred significances and
some attempt made to discover the reason for one sound having
these various significant uses, the foundation of a real Science of
Languages might have been formed. We should incidentally
have discovered, perhaps, the real connections of the ancient
languages and the common mentality of the so-called Aryan
peoples. We find dolabra in Latin for axe, we find no corresponding word in Greek or Sanskrit for axe; to argue thence
that the Aryan forefathers had not invented or adopted the axe
as a weapon before their dispersion, is to land oneself in a region
of futile and nebulous uncertainties and rash inferences. But
when we have noted that dolabra in Latin, dolon in Greek, dala,
dalapa and dalmi in Sanskrit were all various derivatives freely
developed from dal to split, and all used for some kind of weapon,
we get hold of a fruitful and luminous certainty. We see the
common or original mentality working, we see the apparently
free and loose yet really regular processes by which words were
formed; we see too that not the possession of the same identical
formed words, but the selection of a root word and of one among
¹Dolos, fraud; dolon,
dagger; doulos, slave.
Page
–567
several children of the same root word
to express a particular
object or idea was the secret both of the common element and of
the large and free variation that we actually mid of the vocabulary of the Aryan languages.
I have said enough to show the character of the enquiry which I propose to
pursue in the present work. This character arises necessarily from the very
nature of the problem we have before us, the processes by which language took
birth and formation. In the physical sciences we have a simple and homogeneous material of study; for, however complex may be the
forces or constituents at work, they are all of one nature and
obey one class of laws; all the constituents are forms developed
by the vibration of material ether, all the forces are energies of
these ethereal vibrations which have either knotted themselves
into these formal constituents of objects and are at work in them
or else still work freely upon them from outside. But in the
mental sciences we are confronted with heterogeneous material
and heterogeneous forces and action of forces; we have to deal
first with a physical material and medium, the nature and action
of which by itself would be easy enough to study and regular
enough in its action, but for the second element, the mental
agency working in and upon its physical medium and material.
We see a cricket ball flying through the air, we know the elements
of action and statics that work into and upon its flight and we
can tell easily enough either by calculation or judgment not only
in what direction it will pursue its flight, but where it will fall.
We see a bird flying through the air, — a physical object like the
cricket ball flying through the same physical medium; but we
know neither in what direction it will fly, nor where it will alight.
The material is the same, a physical body, the medium is the
same, the physical atmosphere; to a certain extent even the
energy is the same, the physical Pranic energy, as it is called in
our philosophy, inherent in matter. But another force not
physical has seized on this physical force, is acting in it and on it
and so far as the physical medium will allow, fulfilling itself
through it. This force is mental energy, and its presence suffices
to change the pure or molecular Pranic energy we find in the
cricket ball into the mixed or nervous Pranic energy we find in
Page
–568
the bird. But if we could so develop
our mental perceptions as
to be able to estimate by judgment or measure by calculation
the force of nervous energy animating the bird at the moment of
its flight, even then we could not determine its direction or goal.
The reason is that there is not only a difference in the energy, but
a difference in the agency. The agency is the mental power dwelling in the merely physical object, the power of a mental will
which is not only indwelling but to a certain extent free. There
is an intention in the bird's flight; if we can perceive that intention, we can then judge whither it will fly, where it will alight,
provided always that it does not change its intention. The cricket
ball is also thrown by a mental agent with an intention, but that
agent being external and not indwelling, the ball cannot, once
it is propelled in a certain direction, with a certain force, change
that direction or exceed that force unless turned or driven
forward by a new object it meets in it& flight. n itself it is not
free. The bird is also propelled by a mental agent with an intention, in a certain direction, with a certain force of nervous energy
in its flight. Let nothing change in the mental will working it
and its flight may possibly be estimated and fixed like the cricket
ball's. It also may be turned by an object meeting it, a tree or a
danger in the way, an attractive object out of the way, but the
mental power dwells within and is, as we should say, free to
choose whether it shall be turned aside or not, whether it shall
continue its way or not. But also it is free entirely to change its
original intention without any external reasons, to increase or
diminish, to use its output of nervous energy in the act, to employ
it in a direction and towards a goal which are quite foreign to
the original object of the flight. We can study and estimate
the physical and nervous forces it uses, but we cannot make
a science of the bird's flight unless we go behind matter and
material force and study the nature of this conscious agent and
the laws, if any, which determine, annul or restrict its apparent
freedom.
Philology is the attempt to form such a
mental science, —
for language has this twofold, aspect; its material is physical,
the sounds formed by the human tongue working on the air
vibrations; the energy using it is nervous, the molecular Pranic
Page
–569
activity of the brain using the vocal
agents and itself used and
modified by a mental energy, the nervous impulse to express,
to bring out of the crude material of sensation the clearness and
preciseness of the idea; the agent using it is a mental will, free so
far as we can see, but free within the limits of its physical material
to vary and determine its use, for that purpose, of the range of
vocal sound. In order to arrive at the laws which have governed
the formation of any given human tongue, — and my purpose
now is not to study the origins of human speech generally, but the
origins of Aryan speech, — we must examine, first, the way in
which the instrument of vocal sound has been determined and
used by the agent, secondly, the way in which the relation of the
particular ideas to be expressed to the particular sound or
sounds which express it, has been determined. There must
always be these two elements, the structure of the language, its
seeds, roots, formation and growth, and the psychology of the
use of the structure.
Alone of the Aryan tongues, the present
structure of the
Sanskrit language still preserves this original type of the Aryan
structure. In this ancient tongue alone, we see not entirely in all
the original forms, but in the original essential parts and rules of
formation, the skeleton, the members, the entrails of this organism. It is through this study, then, of Sanskrit, especially aided
by whatever light we can get from the more regular and richly-structured among the other Aryan languages, that we must seek
for our origins. The structure we find is one of extraordinary
initial simplicity and also of extraordinarily mathematical and
scientific regularity of formation. We have in Sanskrit four open
sounds or pure vowels, a (अ), i (इ), u (उ), ṛ (
ऋ) with
their lengthened forms, ā (आ), ī (ई), ū (
ऊ), and
ṛ (ॠ) (we have
to mention but may omit for practical purposes the rare vowel Iṛ, (लृ),
supplemented by two other open sounds which the grammarians
are probably right in regarding as impure vowels or modifications
of i (इ) and
u (उ);
they are the vowels e
(ए)
and o (ओ), each
with its farther modification into ai (ऐ) and au (औ). Then we
have five symmetrical Vargas or classes of closed sounds or
consonants, the gutturals, k (क्), kh (ख्), g (ग्), gh
(घ्), n (ङ्), the
palatals c (च्),ch (छ्), j (ज्), jh (झ्), ñ (ञ्), the
cerebrals, answering
Page
–570
approximately to the English
dentals, ̣ṭ (ट्), ṭh (ठ्), ḍ (ड्),
ḍh (ढ्), ṇ (ण्); the pure dentals answering to the Celtic and
continental dentals we find in Irish and in French, Spanish or
Italian t (त्), th (थ्), d (द्), dh
(ध्),
n (न्) and the labials, p
(प्),
ph (फ्),
b (ब्), bh (भ्), m (म्). Each of these classes consists of a
hard sound, k (क्),
c (च्), t
(ट्), ṭ (त्), p (प्), with
its aspirate, kh
(ख्), ch
(छ्), ṭh (ठ्), th
(थ्),
ph (फ्), a corresponding sound
g (ग्),
j (ज्)
ḍ (ड्)
d (द्), b
(ब्)
with its aspirate gh (घ), jh (झ्), ḍh (ढ्), dh
(ध्), bh (भ्), and a class nasal, n (ञ्), ñ (ण्), ṇ (न्),
n (ङ्,) m (म्).
But of these nasals only the last three have any separate existence or importance; the others are modifications of the general
nasal sound, m (म्), n (न्), which are found only in conjunction
with the other consonants of their class and are brought into
existence by that conjunction. The cerebral class is also a peculiar
class; they have so close a kinship to the dental both in sound
and in use that they may almost be regarded as modified dentals
rather than an original separate class. Finally, in addition to the
ordinary vowels and consonants we have a class composed of the
four liquids y (य्),
r (र्),
I (ल्), v (व्), which are evidently
treated
as semi-vowels, y (य्) being the semi-vowel form of i (इ), v (व्)
of u (उ), r
(र्)
of ṛ (ऋ), / (ल्) of Iṛ
(लृ),—this
semi-vowel
character of r (र्) and / (ल्) is the reason Why in Latin prosody
they have not always the full value of the consonant, why, for
instance, the u in volueris is optionally long or short; we have
the triple sibilation ś (श्),
ṣ (ष्)
and s (स्), ś, palatal, ṣ
cerebral,
s dental; we have the pure aspirate, h (ह). With the possible
exception of the cerebral class and the variable nasal, it can
hardly be doubted, I think, that the Sanskrit alphabet represents
the original vocal instrument of Aryan speech. Its regular, symmetrical and methodical character is evident and might tempt
us to see in it a creation of some scientific intellect, if we did not
know that Nature in a certain portion other pure physical action
has precisely this regularity, symmetry and fixity and that the
mind, at any rate in its earlier unintellectualised action, when
man is more guided by sensation and impulse and hasty perception, tends to bring in the element of irregularity and caprice
and not a greater method and symmetry. We may even say,
not absolutely, but within the range of the linguistic facts and
Page
–571
periods available to us, the greater
the symmetry and unconscious
scientific regularity, the more ancient the stage of the language.
The advanced stages of language show an increasing detrition,
deliquescence, capricious variation, the loss of useful sounds,
the passage, sometimes transitory, sometimes permanent of slight
and unnecessary variations of the same sound to the dignity of
separate letters. Such a variation, unsuccessful in permanence
can be seen in the Vedic modification of the soft cerebral ḍ (ड्)
into a cerebral liquid ḷ (ळ्). This sound disappears in later
Sanskrit, but has fixed itself in Tamil and Marathi. Such is the
simple instrument out of which the majestic and expressive
harmonies of the Sanskrit language have been formed.
The use of the instrument by the earlier Aryans for the formation of words seems to have been equally symmetrical, methodical and in close touch with the physical facts of vocal expression. These letters are used as so many seed-sounds; out of
them primitive root-sounds are formed by the simple combination of the four vowels or less frequently the modified vowels
with each of the consonants, the two dependent nasals n (ङ्)
and ñ (ञ्) and the cerebral nasal ṇ
(ण्) excepted. Thus with d
(द्)
as a base sound, the early Aryans were able to make for themselves root-sounds which they used indifferently as nouns, adjectives, verbs or adverbs to express root-ideas, —da (द), da (दा),
di (दि ), dī (दी), du (दु), dū (दू), dṛ (दृ), and
dṛ (दॄ). All these
roots did not endure as separate words, but those which did,
left an often vigorous progeny behind them which preserve
in themselves the evidence for the existence of their progenitor.
Especially have the roots formed by the short a (अ) passed out of
use without a single exception. In addition the Aryans could form
if they chose the modified root-sounds de (दे), dai (दै),
do (दो), dau (दौ). The vowel bases were also used, since the nature of speech
permitted it, as root-sounds and root-words. But obviously the
kernel of language, though it might suffice for primitive beings, is
too limited in range to satisfy the self-extensive tendency of human
speech. We see therefore a class of secondary root-sounds and
root-words grow up from the primitive root by the further addition to it of any of the consonant sounds with its necessary or
natural modification of the already existing root-idea. Thus on
Page
–572
the basis of the now lost primitive
root da, it was possible to have
four guttural short secondary roots, dak (दक्), dakh
(दख्), dag
(दग्), dagh (दघ्) and four long, dāk (दाक्), dākh (दाख्), dāg (दाग्),
dāgh
(दाघ्), which might be regarded either as separate words or long
forms of the short root; so also eight palatal, eight cerebral,
with the two nasal forms daṇ (दण्) and dāṇ (दाण्), making ten,
ten dental, ten 'labial liquid, six sibilant and two aspirate
secondary roots. It was possible also to nasalise any of these
forms, establishing for instance, dank (दंक्), dankh (दंख्), dang
(दंग्) and dangh (दंघ्). It seems not unnatural to suppose that
all these roots existed in the earlier forms of the Aryan Speech,
but by the time of our first literary records, the greater number
of them have disappeared, some leaving behind them a scanty or
numerous progeny, others perishing with their frail descendants.
If we take a single example, the primitive base root ma (म),
we find ma (म) itself dead but existing in the noun forms ma
(म), mā (मा), man (मन्), mataḥ (मत:), matam (मतम्);
man (मन्)
existing only in the nasal form mank (मंक्) and in its own descendants makara (मकर), makura (मकुर), makula (मकुल) etc., and in
tertiary formations makk (मक्क्) and makṣ (मक्क्ष्); makk (मक्क्)
still
existing as a root-word in the forms makh (मख्) and mankh (मंख्); mag (मग्) only in its descendants and in its nasal forms
mang (मंग्), magh (मघ्) in its nasalised form mangh
(मंघ्); mac(मच्)
still alive, but childless except in its nasal disguise manc (मंच्);
mach (मछ्) dead with its
posterity, maj (मज्) alive in its descendants
and its nasal form manj (मंज्), majh (मझ्) wholly obsolete. We
find in the long forms mā. (मा) and mākṣ (माक्ष्) as separate
roots and words with māk (माक्), mākh (माख्), māgh (माघ्),
māc (माच् ), and māch (माछ्) as their substantial parts, but
more usually deriving, it would seem, from a lengthening of
the short root, than from the long form as a separate root.
Finally, tertiary roots have been formed less regularly but still
with some freedom by the addition of semi-vowels to the seed-sound in either primitive or secondary root thus giving us roots
like dhyai (ध्यै), dhvan (ध्वन्), sru (स्रु), hlād (ह्लाद्), or of
other
consonants where the combination was possible, giving us roots
like stu (स्तु), ścyu (श्च्यु), hrad (ह्रद) etc., or else by the
addition of
another consonant to the final of the secondary root, giving us
Page
–573
forms like vall (वल्ल्), majj
(मज्ज्) etc. These are the pure root-forms. But a sort of illegitimate tertiary root is formed by the
vowel guṇa or modification, as for example, of the vowel ṛ
(ऋ) into ar (अर्), and ṛ (ॠ) into ār (आर्), so that we have
the
alternative forms ṛc (ऋच) and arc (अर्च्)
or ark (अर्क्); the
forms
carṣ (चर्ष्) and car (चर्) replacing cṛṣ (चृष्) and cṛ
(चृ) which
are now dead, the forms mṛj (मृज्) and marj (मर्ज्) etc. We find
too, certain early tendencies of consonantal modifications,
one has an initial tendency to get rid of the palatal c (च्)
ch (छ्) and j (ज्) jh (झ्), replace them by
k (क्) and
g (ग्), a
tendency entirely fulfilled in Latin, but arrested in the course
of half fulfilment in Sanskrit. This principle of guṇa is of great
importance in the study of the physical formation of the
language and of its psychological development, especially as it
introduces a first element of doubt and confusion into an
otherwise crystal clearness of structure and perfect mechanic
regularity of formation. The vowel guna or modification works
by the substitution either of the modified vowel, e (ए) for i (इ),
o (ओ) for u
(उ),
so that we have from vi (वि) the case
form ves
(वेस्), veḥ. (वे:), from janu (जनु) the case form janoḥ (जनो:),
or of the
pure semi-vowel sound y (य्) for i (इ), v (व्) for
u (उ),
r (र्)
for
ṛ (ऋ), or a little impurely rā (रा), so that from vi (वि) we
have the
verbal form vyantaḥ. (व्यन्त:), from śu (शु), the verbal form aśvaḥ
(अश्व:), from vṛ
(वृ) or, vṛh (व्रह) the noun vraha (वृह), or else of
me supported semi-vowel sound, ay (अय्) for i (इ), av (अव्) for
u (उ), ar (अर्) for ṛ(ऋ),
al (अल्) for lṛ
(लृ), so that
we have
from vi the noun vayas (वयस्), from śru (श्रु) the noun śravas
(श्रवस्), from sṛ (सृ) the noun saras
(सरस्), from klṛp
(क्लृप्)
the
noun kalpa (कल्प). These forms constitute the simple gunation
of the short vowel sounds a (अ), i (इ),
u (उ),
ṛ (ऋ), lr
(लृ)
in
addition we have the long modification or vrddhi, an extension
of the principle of lengthening which gives us the long forms
of the words; we have ai (ऐ) or āy (आय्
) from i (इ), au
(औ) or āv
(आव्) from
u (उ), ār (अर्) from ṛ (ऋ), āl (आल्) from
Iṛ (लृ),
while a (अ) has no vṛddhi proper but only the lengthening ā (आ). The principal confusion that arises out of this primitive
departure from simplicity of sound-development is the frequent
uncertainty between a regular secondary root and the irregular
Page
–574
gunated root. We have, for instance,
the regular root ar (अर्)
deriving from the primitive root a (अ) and the illegitimate root
ar (अर) deriving from the primitive root ṛ (ऋ); we have the
forms kala (कल) and kāla (काल), which, if judged only by their
structure, may derive either from klṛ (क्लृ) or from kal (कल्);
we
have āyus (अयुस्) and ayus (आयुस्) which, similarly judged, may
derive either from the root forms a (अ) and ā (आ) or from the
root forms u (उ)
and i (इ). The main consonantal modifications
in Sanskrit are structural and consist in the assimilation of
like consonants, a hard sound becoming soft by association
with a soft sound, as soft sound hard by association with a hard
sound, aspirates being replaced in conjunction by the corresponding unaspirated sound and modifying their companion in
return, e.g. lapsyate (लप्स्यते) and labdhum (लब्धुम्) from labh
(लभ्)
substituted for labh-syate (लभ्-स्यते) and labh-tum (लभ्-तुम्), vyūḍha
(व्युढ) from vyūh (व्युह्)
replacing vyūhta (व्युह्त)
. Beyond this
tendency to obey certain subtle but easily recognisable tendencies of mutual modification, which in themselves suggest
only certain minor and unimportant doubts, the one really
corruptive tendency in Sanskrit is the arrested impulse towards
disappearance of the palatal family. This has gone so far that
such forms as ketu (केतु) can be considered by Indian grammarians, quite erroneously, to proceed from the root cit (चित्)
and not from the root kit (कित्) which is its natural parent.
In reality, however, the only genuine palatal modifications are
those in sandhi, which substitute k (क्) for c (च्), g
(ग्) for j (ज्)
at the end of a word or in certain combinations, e.g. lagna (लग्न)
for lajna (लज्न), vaktṛ (वक्तृ) for vactṛ (वच्तृ), vakva (वक्व) for vacva
(वच्व), the noun vākya (वाक्य) from the root vac (वच्), the
perfect cikāya (चिकाय) and cikye (चिक्ये). Side by side with these
modificatory combinations we have regular forms, such as yajña,
(यज्ञ) vācya (वाच्य), cicāya (चिचाय), cicye (चिच्ये). It is even
open to question whether the forms cikāya (चिकाय) and cikye
(चिक्ये) are not rather from the root ki (कि) than actual descendants from the parent root ci (चि) in whose nest they have
found a home.
These elements of variation noted, we
are in a position to
follow the second stage in the flowering of speech from the root-state
Page
–575
to the stage in which we pass on
by a natural transition
to the structural development of language. So far we have a
language formed of the simplest and most regular elements.
The seed-sounds, eight vowels and their modifications four in
number; five classes of consonants and the nasals; one quaternary of liquids or semi-vowels: three sibilants; one aspirate
based on each of these; their first developments, the primitive
and parent roots, as from the seed-sound v (व्), the primitive root-group va (व), vā (वा), vi (वि), vī (वी), vṛ
(वृ) vṛ (वॄ) and possibly
vu (वु), vū (वू), ve (वे), vai (वै), vo
(वो),vau (वौ);
round each
primitive root its family of secondary roots, round the primitive
va (व) its family, vak (वक्), vakh (वख्), vag (वग्), vagh
(वघ्);
vac (वच्), vach (वछ्), vaj
(वज्), vajh (वझ्); vaṭ (वट्), vaṭh (वठ्),
vaḍ (वड्), vaḍh (वढ), vaṇ (वण्);
vat (वत्), vath (वथ्), vad
(वद्),
vadh (वध्), van (वन्); vap (वप्), vaph (वफ्), vab (वब्), vabh
(वभ्),
vam (वम्)
; and possibly vay (वय्), var (वर्), val (वल्), vav
(वव्); vaś (वश्), vas (वष्), vas (वस्), vah (वह्); —the eight or more families
of this group forming a root-clan, with a certain variable
number of tertiary dependents such as vañc (वञच्), vang (वङग्),
vand (वन्द्), valg (वल्ग्), vams (वंस्), vank (वङ्क्) vraj (व्रज्) etc.
Forty of these clans would constitute the whole range of
primitive language. Each word would in the primitive nature
of language, like each man in the primitive constitution
of human society, fulfil at once several functions, noun,
verb, adjective and adverb at once, the inflection of the
voice, the use of gesture and the quickness of the instinct
making up for the absence of delicacy and precision in the
shades of speech. Such a language though of small compass
would be one, it is clear, of great simplicity, of mechanical regularity of formation built up perfectly in its small range by the
automatic methods of Nature, and sufficient to express the first
physical and emotional needs of the human race. But the increasing demands of the intellect would in time compel a fresh growth
of language and a more intricate flowering of forms. The first
instrument in such a growth, the first in urgency, importance and
time, would be the impulse towards distinguishing more formally
between the action, the agent and the object, and therefore of
establishing some sort of formal distinction, however vague at
Page
–576
first, between the noun-idea and the
verb-idea. The second impulse, possibly simultaneous, would be towards
distinguishing structurally, — for it is possible that the various root forms of
one family were already used for that object, — between the various lines and
shades of action, of establishing in modern language, tense forms, voices,
moods. The third impulse would be towards the formal distinction of various
attributes, such as number and gender, and various relations of the subject and
object themselves to the action, of establishing case forms and forms of
singularity, duality, plurality. The elaboration of special forms for adjective
and adverb seems to have been a later, the latter in fact the latest of the
operations of structural development, because in the early mentality the need of these distinctions
was the least pressing.
When we examine how the old Aryan
speakers managed
the satisfaction of these needs and this new and rich efflorescence
of the language plant we find that Nature in them was perfectly
faithful to the principle of her first operations and that the whole
of the mighty structure of the Sanskrit language was built up by
a very slight extension of her original movement. This extension
was reared and made possible by the simple, necessary and inevitable device of using the vowels a (अ)
i (इ), u
(उ) and ṛ
(ऋ)
with their long forms and modifications as enclitic or support
sounds subsequently prefixed sometimes to the root, but at first
used to form appendage sounds only. The Aryans by the aid
of this device proceeded, just as they had formed root-words
by adding the consonant sounds to the primitive root-sounds,
by adding for instance d (द्) or l (ल्) to va (व) had formed vad
(वद्) and val (वल्), so now to form structural sounds by adding to
the developed root-word any of the same consonant sounds, pure
or conjunct with others, with an enclitic sound either as the
connective support or a formatory support or both, or else by
adding the enclitic sound alone as a substantial appendage.
Thus, having the root vad (वद्), they could form from it at
their will by the addition of the consonant t (त्), vadat
(वदत्),
vadit (वदित्), vadut (वदुत्), vadṛt (वदृत्) or vadata (वदत), vadita
(वदित), vaduta (वदुत), vadṛta (वदृत), or vadati (वदति), vaditi
(वदिति),
vaduti (वदुति), vadṛti (वदृति) or vadatu (वदतु), vaditu
(वदितु), vadutu
Page
–577
(वदुतु), vadṛtu (वदृतु), or else vadatri
(वदत्रि), vaditri (वदित्रि), vadutri
(वदुत्रि); vadṛtri (वदृत्रि) or else they could use the enclitic only and
form vada (वद), vadi (वदि), vadu (वदु), vadṛ (वदृ), or they
could
employ the conjunct sounds tr (त्र्), ty (त्य्), tv (त्व्), tm (त्म्),
tn
(त्न्), and produce such forms as vadatra (वदत्र), vadatya (वदत्य), vadatva (वदत्व), vadatma (वदत्म), vadatna (वदत्न). As a matter of
fact we do not find and would not expect to find all these possibilities actually used in the case of a single word. With the
growth of intellectual richness and precision there would be a
corresponding growth in the mental will-action and the supersession of the mechanical mind processes by more clearly and
consciously selective mind processes. Nevertheless we do find
practically all these forms distributed over the root-clans and
families of the Aryan word-nation. We find the simple nominal
forms built by the addition of the sole enclitic richly and almost
universally distributed. The richness of forms is much greater
in earlier Aryan speech than in later literature. From the root
san (सन्) for instance, we find in Vedic speech all the forms
sana (सन), sani (सनि), sanu (सनु) (contracted into snu
स्नु),
but
in later Sanskrit they have all disappeared. We find also in
Veda variants like caratha (चरथ) and carutha (चरुथ), raha (रह)
and rāha (राह), but in later Sanskrit caratha (चरथ) has been
rejected, rah (रह्) and rāh (रह्) preserved but rigidly distinguished in their significances. We find most nouns in
possession of the a (अ) noun form, some in possession of the i
(इ) form, some in possession of the u
(उ) form. We find a
preference for the simple hard consonant over the aspirate and
the soft p (प्) is more frequent in structural nouns than
ph (फ्)
or bh (भ्) but both
ph (फ्) and bh
(भ्) occur, p (प्) is
more
frequent than b (ब्), but b (ब्) occurs. We find certain consonants
preferred over others, especially k (क्), t
(त्), n (न्),
s (स्) either
in themselves or in their combinations; we find certain appendage forms like as (अस्), in (इन्), an (अन्), at (अत्),
tri (त्रि),
vat (वत्),
van (वन्), formalised into regular nominal and verbal
terminations. We see double appendages, side by side with the
simple jitva (जित्व), we may have jitvara (जित्वर), jitvan (जित्वन)
etc. Throughout we see or divine behind the present state of
the Sanskrit language a wide and free natural labour of formation
Page
–578
followed by a narrowing process of
rejection and selection. But always the same original principle, either simply
or complexly applied, with modification or without modification of the
root-vowels and consonants, is and remains the whole basis
and means of noun-structure.
In the variations of the verb, in the
formation of case we
find always the same principle. The root conjugates itself by the
addition of appendages such as mi (मि), si (सि), ti (ति),
etc., m (म्),
y (य्)
. h (ह्), ta (त), va (व), (all of them forms
used also for
nominal structures), either simply or with the support of the
enclitic a (अ), i (इ), or rarely u
(उ), short,
lengthened or modified, giving us such forms as vacmi (वच्मि), vakṣi (वक्षि), vadasi
(वदसि), vadāsi (वदासि), vadat (वद्त्), vadati (वदति), vadāti
(वदाति).
In the verb forms other devices are used such as the insertion
of an appendage like n (न्), nā, (ना), nu (नु) or ni (नि)
in preference to the simple vowel enclitic; the prefixing of the enclitic
a (अ) or augment to help out the fixing of tense significance;
the reduplication of the essential part
of the root in various ways,
etc. We notice the significant fact that even here Vedic Sanskrit
is much richer and freer in its variations. Sanskrit is yet more
narrow, rigid and selective, the former using alternative forms
like bhavati (भवति), bhavaḥ (भव:), bhavate (भवते). The latter
rejects
all but the first. The case inflexions differ from the verb forms
only in the appendages prefixed, not in their principle or
even in themselves; as (अस्), am (अम्), ās (आस्), os
(ओस्), ām
(आम्) are all verbal as well as nominal inflexions. But substantially the whole of the language with all its forms and inflexions is the inevitable result of the use by Nature in man of one
single rich device, one single fixed principle of sound formation
employed with surprisingly few variations, with an astonishingly
fixed, imperative and almost tyrannous regularity but also a free
and even superfluous original abundance in the formation. The inflexional character of Aryan speech is itself no accident but the
inevitable result, almost physically inevitable, of the first seed
selection of sound-process, that original apparently trifling selection of the law of the individual being which is at the basis of all
Nature's infinitely varied regularities. Fidelity to the principle
already selected being once observed the rest results from the
Page
–579
very nature and necessities of the
sound-instrument that is
employed. Therefore, in the outward form of language, we see the
operation of a regular natural law proceeding almost precisely
as Nature proceeds in the physical world to form a vegetable or
an animal genus and its species.
We have taken one step in the
perception of the laws that
govern the origin and growth of language; but this step is nothing
or little unless we can find an equal regularity, an equal reign of
fixed process on the psychological side, in the determining of the
relation of particular sense to particular sound. No arbitrary or
intellectual choice but a natural selection has determined the
growth and arrangement of the sounds, simple or structural, in
their groups and families. Is it an arbitrary or intellectual choice
or a law of natural selection that has determined their significances ? If the latter be true and it must be so, if a Science of
Language be possible, then having this peculiar arrangement of
significant sounds, certain truths follow inevitably. First: the
seed-sound v (व), for example, must have in it something inherent
in it which connected it in man's mind originally in the first
natural state of speech, with the actual senses borne by the
primitive roots va (व), vā (वा),
vi (वि), vī (वी), vu
(वु),vū(वू),
vṛ (वृ) vṛ (वॄ) in the primitive language.Secondly, whatever
variations there are in sense between these roots must be
determined originally by some inherent tendency of significance
in the variable or vowel element, a (अ), ā (आ), i (इ),
ī (ई),
u (उ), ū (ऊ), ṛ (ऋ), ṛ (ॠ). Thirdly, the secondary roots depending
in va (व), vac (वच्), vakh (वख्), vañj (वञज्), vam
(वम्), val (वल्), vap (वप्), vah (वह्), vaś (वश्), vas (वस्), etc. must have
a
common element in their significances and, so far as they varied
originally, must have varied as a result of the element of
difference, the consonantal termination c
(च्) , j (ज्), m (म्), /
(ल्),
p (प्). h (ह्), ś (श्). s (स्) respectively. Finally in
the structural
state of language, although as a result of the growing power
of conscious selection other determining factors may have entered
into the selection of particular significances for the particular
words, yet the original factor cannot have been entirely inoperative and such forms as vadana (वदन), vadatra (वदत्र), vada
(वद),
etc. must have been governed in the development of their sense
Page
–580
dominantly by their substantial and
common sound-element, to
a certain extent by their variable and subordinate element. I
shall attempt to show by an examination of the Sanskrit
language that all these laws are actually true of Aryan speech,
their truth borne out or often established beyond a shadow of
doubt by the facts of the language.
THE
END
Page
–581
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