The United States of Europe
WE HAVE had to dwell so long upon the possibilities of the
Empire-group because the evolution of the imperial State is a dominating
phenomenon of the modern world; it governs the political tendencies of the later
part of the nineteenth and earlier part of the twentieth century very much as
the evolution of the free democratised nation governed
the age which preceded ours. The dominant idea of the French Revolution was the
formula of the free and sovereign people and, in spite of the cosmopolitan
element introduced into the revolutionary formula by the ideal of fraternity,
this idea became in fact the assertion of the free, independent, democratically
self- governed nation. That ideal had not at the time of the Great War wholly
worked itself out even in the occidental world; for central Europe was only
partly democratised and Russia had only just begun to turn its face towards the
common goal; and even now there are still subject European peoples or fragments
of peoples.1 Nevertheless, with whatever imperfections, the idea
of the free democratic nation had practically triumphed in all America and
Europe. The peoples of Asia have equally accepted this governing ideal of the
nineteenth century, and though the movements of democratic nationalism in the
eastern countries, Turkey, Persia, India, China, were not fortunate in their
first attempts at self-realisation, the profound and widespread working of the
idea cannot be doubted by any careful observer. Whatever modifications may
arrive, whatever new tendencies intervene, whatever reactions oppose, it could
hardly then be doubted that the principal gifts of the French Revolution must
remain and be universalised as permanent acquisitions, indispensable elements
in the future order of the world,
-
national
1 No
longer an evident fact, although the substitution of a state of vassalage may
stilI be there.
Page-324
self-consciousness
and
self-government, freedom and enlightenment for the people and so much social equality and
justice at least as is indispensable to political liberty; for with any form of
fixed and rigid inequality democratic self-government is incompatible.
But before the great nineteenth century
impulse could work itself out everywhere, before even it could realise itself
entirely in Europe, a new tendency has intervened and a new idea seized on the
progressive mind of humanity. This is the ideal of the perfectly organised
State. Fundamentally, the ideal of the perfectly organised State is socialistic
and it is based on the second word of the great revolutionary formula,
equality, just as the movement of the nineteenth century centered round the
first, liberty. The first impulse given by the great European upheaval attained
only to a certain kind of political equality. An incomplete social levelling
still left untouched the one inequality and the one form of political
preponderance which no competitive society can eliminate, the preponderance of
the haves over the have-nots, the inequality between the more successful in the
struggle of life and the less successful which is rendered inevitable by
difference of capacity, unequal opportunity and the handicap of circumstance
and environment. Socialism seeks to get rid of this persistent inequality by
destroying the competitive form of society and substituting the co-operative. A
co-operative form of human society existed formerly in the shape of the
commune; but the restoration of the commune as a unit would imply practically
the return to the old city-state, and as this is not now possible with the
larger groupings and greater complexities of modern life, the socialistic idea
could only be realised through the rigorously organised national State. To eliminate
poverty, not by the crude idea of equal distribution but by the holding of all
property in common and its' management through the organised State, to equalise
opportunity and capacity as far as possible through universal education and
training, again by means of the organised State, is the fundamental idea of
modern Social- ism. It implies an abrogation or at least a rigorous diminution
of all individual liberty. Democratic Socialism still clings indeed to the
nineteenth-century ideal of political freedom; it insists on
Page-325
the equal right of all in the State to choose, judge, and
change their own governors, but all other liberty it is ready to sacrifice to
its own central idea.
The progress of the Socialistic idea would
seem therefore to lead towards the evolution of a perfectly organised national
State which would provide for and control the education and training, manage
and govern all the economic activities and for that purpose as well as for the
assurance of perfect efficiency, morality, well-being and social justice, order
the whole or at any rate the greater part of the external and internal life of
its component individuals. It would effect, in fact, by organised State control
what earlier societies attempted by social pressure, rigorous rule of custom,
minute code and Shastra. This was always an inherently inevitable development
of the revolutionary ideal. It started to the surface at first under pressure
of external danger in the Government of France by the Jacobins during the Reign
of Terror; it has been emerging and tending to realise itself under pressure of
an inner necessity throughout the later part of the nineteenth century; it has
emerged not completely but with a first rudimentary sketch of completeness by
the combination of the inner and the outer necessity during the present War.
What was before only an ideal towards which some imperfect initial steps alone
were immediately possible, has now become a realisable programme with its
entire feasibility established by a convincing, though necessarily hasty and
imperfect, practical demonstration. It is true that in order to realise it even
political liberty has had to be temporarily abolished; but this, it may be
argued, is only an accident of the moment, a concession to temporary necessity.
In freer conditions what was done partly and for a time by governments which
the people have consented to invest with an absolute and temporarily
irresponsible authority, may be done, when there is no pressure of war, wholly
and permanently by the self-governing democratic
State.
In that case the near futl1re of the
human group would seem to be the nation, self-governing, politically free, but
aiming at perfect social and economic organisation and ready for that purpose
to hand over all individual liberty to the control of the
Page-326
organised
national State.1 As France was in the end
of the eighteenth and beginning of the
nineteenth century the great propagandist and the experimental workshop of
political liberty and equality, so Germany has been in the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth century the chief propagandist and the
experimental workshop of the idea of the organised State. There the theory of
Socialism has taken rise and there its propaganda
has been most effective, so that a large proportion
of the nation committed itself to the new
gospel; there also the great socialistic measures and those which have
developed the control of the individual by the State for the common good and
efficiency of the nation have been most thoroughly and admirably conceived and
executed. It matters little that this was done by an anti-socialistic,
militarist and aristocratic government; the very fact is a proof of the
irresistible strength of the new tendency, and the inevitable transference of
the administrative power from its past holders to the people was all that was
needed to complete its
triumph.
Throughout the recent decades we have
seen the growth of German ideas and the increasing tendency to follow the
German methods of State interference and State control in other countries, even
in England, the home of individualism. The defeat of Germany in the European
War no more spelt the defeat of her ideals than the defeat of revolutionary and
Napoleonic France by the European coalition and even the temporary triumph of
the monarchic and aristocratic system prevented the spread of her new ideas
over all Europe. Even if German militarism and Junkerism were destroyed, the
collapse of the imperial form or government can only hasten the more thorough
development and victory of that which has been working behind them and forcing
them to minister to it, the great modern tendency of the perfectly organised
socialistic State, while the evident result of the War in the nations opposed
to her has been to force them more rapidly towards the same ideal.
If this were all, the natural development of things
aided by
1 This was done
with a stupendous beginning of thoroughness in Bolshevist Russia, Nazi Germany,
Fascist Italy, and the necessity of the choice of it threatened at one time to
spread everywhere.
Page-327
the
frustration of the German form of imperialism would lead logically to a new
ordering of the world on the basis of a system of independent but increasingly
organised national States associated together more or less closely for
international purposes while preserving their independent existence. Such is the
ideal which has attracted the human mind as a yet distant possibility since the
great revolutionary ferment set in; it is the idea of a federation of free
nations, the parliament of man, the federation of the world. But the actual
circumstances forbid any hope of any such ideal consummation in the near future.
For the nationalistic, democratic and socialistic ideas are not alone at work
in the world; imperialism is equally in the ascendant. Only a few European
peoples at the present moment are nations confined to themselves; each is a
nation free in itself but dominating over human groupings who are not free or
only partially free. Even little Belgium has its Congo, little Portugal its
colonies, little Holland its dependencies in the eastern Archipelago; even
little Balkan States have aspired to revive an "empire" and to rule over others
not of their own nationality or have cherished the idea of becoming predominant
in the peninsula. Mazzini's Italy has its imperialistic ventures and ambitions
in Tripoli, Abyssinia, Albania, the Greek islands. This imperialistic tendency
is likely to grow stronger for some time in the future rather than to weaken.
The idea of a remodelling even of Europe itself on the strict principle of
nationality, which captivated liberal minds in England at the beginning of the
War, has not yet been made practicable and, if it were effected, there would
still remain the whole of Asia and Africa as a field for the imperialistic
ambitions of the Western nations and Japan. The disinterestedness that led a
majority in America to decree the liberation of the Philippines and restrained
the desire to take advantage of the troubles of Mexico is not possible to the
mentality of the Old World, and it is doubtful how long it can stand even in
America against the rising tide of imperialistic sentiment. National egoism, the
pride of domination and the desire of expansion still govern the mind of
humanity, however modified they may now be in their methods by the first weak
beginnings of higher motives and a better national morality, and until this
spirit is radically changed,
Page-328
the
union of the human race by a federation of free nations must remain a noble
chimera.
Undoubtedly, a free association and
unity must be the ultimate goal of our development and until it is realised,
the world must be subject to constant changes and revolutions.
Every established
order, because it is imperfect, because it insists on
arrangements which come to be recognised as involving injustice or which stand
in the way of new tendencies and forces, because it outlasts its utility and
justification, must end in malaise, resistance and upheaval, must change
itself or be changed or else lead to cataclysms such as periodically trouble our
human advance. But the time has not come when the true principle of order can
replace those which are artificial and imperfect. It is idle to hope for a
federation of free nations until either the pre- sent inequalities between
nation and nation are removed or else the whole world rises to a common culture
based upon a higher moral and spiritual status than is now actual or possible.
The imperial instinct being alive and dominant and stronger at pre- sent than
the principle of nationalism, the evolution of great empires can hardly fail to
overshadow for a time at least the tendency to the development of free
nationalities. All that can be hoped is that the old artificial, merely
political empire may be replaced by a truer and more moral type, and that the
existing empires, driven by the necessity of strengthening themselves and by an
enlightened self-interest, may come to see that the recognition of national
autonomy is a wise and necessary concession to the still vital instinct of
nationalism and can be used so as to strengthen instead of weakening their
imperial strength and unity. In this way, while a federation of free nations is
for the present impossible, a system of federated empires and free nations
drawn together in a closer association than the world has yet seen is not
altogether impossible; and through this and other steps some form of political
unity for mankind may at a m9re or less distant date be realisable.1
1 The appearance of Hitler and
the colossal attempt at German world-domination have paradoxically helped by
his defeat, and the reaction against him entirely altered the world
circumstances: the United States of Europe is now a practical possibility and
has begun to feel towards self-accomplishment.
Page-329
The War brought up many suggestions for such a closer
association, but as a rule they were limited to a better ordering of the
international relations of Europe. One of these was the elimination of war by a
stricter international law administered by an international Court and supported
by the sanction of the nations which shall be enforced by all of them against
any offender. Such a solution is chimerical unless it is immediately followed
up by farther and far-reaching developments. For the law given by the Court
must be enforced either by an alliance of some of the stronger Powers as, for
instance, the coalition of the victorious allies dominating the rest of Europe,
or by a con- cert of all the European Powers or else by a United States of
Europe or some other form of European federation. A dominating alliance of
great Powers would be simply a repetition in principle of the system of
Metternich and would inevitable break down after some lapse of time, while a
Concert of Europe must mean, as experience has shown, the uneasy attempt of rival
groupings to maintain a precarious understanding which may postpone but cannot
eventually prevent fresh. struggles and collisions. In such imperfect systems
the law would only be obeyed so long as it was expedient, so long only as the
Powers who desired new changes and readjustments not admitted by the others did
not consider the moment opportune for resistance. The Law within a nation is
only secure because there is a recognised authority empowered to determine it
and to make the necessary changes and possessed of a sufficient force to punish
all violation of its statutes. An international or an inter-European law must
have the same advantages if it is to exercise anything more than a merely moral
force which can be set at nought by those who are strong enough to defy it and
who find an advantage in the violation. Some form of European federation, how-
ever loose, is therefore essential if the idea behind these suggestions of a
new order is to be made practically' effective, and once commenced, such a federation
must necessarily be tightened and draw more and more towards the form of a
United States of Europe.
Whether such a European unity can be
formed or whether, if formed, it can be maintained and perfected against the
many
Page-330
forces
of
dissolution, the many causes of quarrel which would
for long try it to the
breaking point, only experience can show. But it is evident that in the present
state of human egoism it would, if formed, become a tremendously powerful
instrument for domination and exploitation of the rest of the world by the
group of nations which are at present in the forefront of human progress. It
would inevitably awaken in antagonism to it an idea of Asiatic unity and an
idea of American unity, and while such continental groupings replacing the
present smaller national ", unities might well be an advance towards the
final union of all mankind, yet their realisation would mean cataclysms of a
kind and scope which would dwarf the present catastrophe and in which the hopes
of mankind might founder and fatally collapse rather than progress nearer to
fulfilment. But the chief objection to the idea of a United States of Europe is
that the general sense of humanity is already seeking to travel beyond its
continental distinctions and make them subordinate to a larger human idea. A
division on the continental basis might therefore be from this point of view a
reactionary step of the gravest kind and might be attended with the most
serious consequences to human progress.
Europe,
indeed, is in this anomalous position that it is at once ripe for the
Pan-European idea and at the same time under the necessity of overpassing it. The conflict of the two tendencies
was curiously exemplified
not so long ago by certain speculations on the nature of the recent European
struggle. It was suggested that the sin of Germany in this War was due to its
exaggerated egoistic idea of the nation and its disregard of the larger idea of
Europe to which the nation-idea must now be subjected and subordinated. The
total life of Europe must now be the all-engrossing unity, its good the
paramount consideration, and the egoism of the nation must consent to exist
only as an organic part of this larger egoism. In effect, this is the
acceptance after so many decades of the idea of Nietzsche who insisted that
nationalism and war were anachronisms and the ideal of all enlightened minds
must be not to be good patriots but good Europeans. But immediately the
question arose, what then or the increasing importance of America in world
politics, what of Japan and China, what of the renewed stirrings of life in
Asia? The writer had there-
Page-331
fore to draw back from his first formula and to explain that
by Europe he meant not Europe but all nations that had accepted the principles
of European civilisation as the basis of their polity and social organisation.
This more philosophical formula has the obvious or at least the specious
advantage that it brings in America and Japan and thus recognises all the
actually free or dominant nations in the circle of the proposed solidarity and
holds out too the hope of admission into the circle to others whenever they
c3;n prove, after the forceful manner of Japan or otherwise, that they too have
come up to the European standard.
Indeed, though Europe is still strongly
separate in its own conception from the rest of the world, - as was shown by
the often expressed resentment of the continual existence of Turkey in Europe
and the desire to put an end to this government of Europeans by Asiatics, - yet
as a matter of fact it is inextricably tangled up with America and Asia. Some
of the European nations have colonies in America, all have possessions and
ambitions in Asia, where Japan alone is outside the shadow cast by Europe, or
in Northern America which is culturally one with Asia. The United States of
Europe would therefore mean a federation of free European nations dominant over
a half-subject Asia and possessor of parts of America and there standing in
uneasy proximity to nations still free and necessarily troubled, alarmed and
overshadowed by this giant immiscence. The inevitable result would be in
America to bring together more closely the Latin Centre and South and the
English-speaking North and to emphasise immensely the Monroe Doctrine with
consequences which cannot easily be foreseen, while in Asia there could be only
one of two final endings to the situation, either the disappearance of the
remaining free Asiatic States or a vast Asiatic resurgence and the recoil of
Europe from Asia. Such movements would be a prolongation of the old line of
human development and set at nought the new cosmopolitan conditions created by
modern culture and Science; but they are inevitable if the nation-idea in the
West is to merge into the Europe-idea, that is to say, into the continental
idea rather than into the wider consciousness of a common humanity.
If, therefore, any new
supra-national order is to evolve
Page-332
sooner or later as a result of the present upheaval,
it must be an
association that will embrace Asia, Africa and America as well
as Europe and it must be in
its nature an organisation of inter- national life constituted by a number' of
free nations such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United States, the Latin re-
publics and a number of imperial and colonising nations such as
, are most of the peoples of Europe. Either the latter
would re- main,
as they now are, free in themselves but masters of subject peoples who, with
the advance of time, would become more and more intolerant of the, yoke imposed
on them or else they would be, by an ethical advance which is as yet very far
from accomplished, partly centres of free federal empires, partly nations holding
in trust races yet backward and undeveloped until they arrived at the capacity
of self-administration, as the United States
have
claimed to
hold for a time the Philippines. In the former
case,
the unity,
the order, the common law established would
perpetuate and be partly founded on an enormous
system of in- justice and exposed to the revolts and revolutions of Nature and
the great revenges by which she finally vindicates the human spirit against
wrongs which she tolerates for a time as necessary incidents of human
development. In the latter, there would be
some chance that the new order,
however far in its beginnings from the ultimate ideal of a free association of free human aggregates,
might lead peacefully and by a natural unfolding of the spiritual and ethical
progress of the race to such a secure, just and healthy political, social and
economic foundation as might enable mankind to turn from its preoccupation with
these lower cares and begin at last that development of its higher
self which is
the nobler part of its potential destiny, or if not that, - for who knows
whether Nature's long experiment in the' human
type
is foredoomed
to success or failure, - at least the loftiest
possibility of our future which the human
mind can envisage.
Page-333
Home