CHAPTER
XIX
The Drive towards Centralisation and Uniformity
–
Administration
and
Control of Foreign Affairs
SUPPOSING
the free grouping of the nations according to their natural affinities,
sentiments, sense of economic and other convenience to be the final basis of a
stable world-union, the next question that arises is what precisely would be
the status of these nation-units in the larger and more complex unity of
mankind. Would they possess only a nominal separateness and become parts of a
machine or retain a real and living individuality and an effective freedom and
organic life? Practically, this comes
to the question whether the ideal of human unity points to the forcible or at
least forceful fusing and welding of mankind into a single vast nation and
centralised World-State with many provinces or to its aggregation under a more
complex, loose and flexible system into a world-union of free nationalities. If
the former more rigorous idea or tendency - or need dominated, we must have a
period of compression, constriction, negation of national and individual
liberties as in the second of the three historical stages of national formation
in Europe. This process would end, if entirely successful, in a centralised
world-government which would impose its uniform, rule and law, uniform administration, uniform economic and
educational system, one culture, one social principle, one civilisation,
perhaps even one language and one religion on all mankind. Centralised, it
would delegate some of its powers to national authorities and councils, but
only as the centralised French government -
Parliament and bureaucracy -
delegate some of their powers to the departmental prefects and councils and
their subordinate officials and communes.
Such a state of things seems a
sufficiently far-off dream and
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assuredly not, .except to the rigid doctrinaire, a very
beautiful dream. Certainly, it would take a long time to become entirely
practicable and would have to be preceded by a period of loose formation
corresponding to the feudal unity of France or Germany in mediaeval Europe.
Still, at the rate of ever accelerated speed with which the world is beginning
to progress and with the gigantic revolutions of international thought, outlook
and practice which the future promises, we have to envisage it as not only an
ultimate, but it may very well be a not immeasurably far-off possibility. If
things continued to move persistently, victoriously in one direction and
Science still farther to annihilate the obstacles of space and of geographical
and mental division which yet exist and to aggrandise its means and powers of
vast and close organisation, it might well become feasible within a century or
two, at the most within three or four. It would be the logical conclusion of
any process in which force and constraint or the predominance of a few great
nations or the emergence of a king-State, an empire predominant on sea and
land, became the principal instrument of unification. It might come about,
supposing some looser unity to be already established, by the triumph
throughout the world of the political doctrine and the coming to political
power of a party of socialistic and internationalistic doctrinaires alike in
mentality to the unitarian Jacobins of the French Revolution who would have no
tenderness for the sentiments of the past or for any form of group
individualism and would seek to crush out of existence all their visible
supports so as to establish perfectly their idea of an absolute human equality
and unity.
A system of
the kind, however established, by whatever forces, governed by the democratic
State idea which inspires modern socialism or by the mere State idea
socialistic perhaps, but undemocratic or anti-democratic, would stand upon the
principle that perfect unity is only to be realised by uniformity. All thought
in fact that seeks to establish unity by mechanical or external means is
naturally attracted towards uniformity. Its thesis would seem to be supported
by history and the lessons of the past; for in the formation of national unity,
the trend to centralisation and uniformity has been the decisive factor,
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a condition of uniformity the culminating point. The
precedent of the formation of diverse and often conflicting elements of a
people into a single national State would naturally be the determining
precedent for the formation of the populations of the earth, the human people,
into a single world-nation and World-State. In modern times there have been
significant examples of the power of this trend towards uniformity which increases as civilisation progresses.
The Turkish movement began with the ideal of toleration for all the heterogeneous
elements - races, languages, religions, cultures - of the ram- shackle
Turkish empire, but inevitably the dominant young Turk element was carried away by the instinct for establishing,
even by coercion, a uniform Ottoman culture and Ottoman nationality. This trend
has found its completion, after the elimination of the Greek element and the
loss of the empire, in the small purely Turkish State of today, but curiously
the national uniformity has been topped by the association with it and
assimilation of European culture and social forms and habits. Belgium, composed
almost equally of Teutonic Flemings and Gallic Walloons, grew into a
nationality under the aegis of a Franco-Belgian culture with French as the
dominant language; the Fleming movement which should logically have contented
itself with equal rights for the two languages, aimed really at a reversal of
the whole position and not merely the assertion but the dominance of the
Flemish language and an indigenous Flemish culture. Germany, uniting her ancient
elements into one body, suffered her existing States with their governments and
administrations to continue, but the possibility of considerable diversities
thus left open was annulled by the centralisation of national life in Berlin; a
nominal separateness existed, but overshadowed by a real and dominant
uniformity which all but converted Germany into the image of a larger Prussia
in spite of the more democratic and humanistic tendencies and institutions of
the Southern States. There are indeed apparent types of a freer kind of
federation, Switzerland, the United States, Australia, South Africa, but even
here the spirit of uniformity really prevails or tends to prevail in spite of
variation in detail and the latitude of free legislation in minor matters
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conceded to the component States. Everywhere unity
seems to call for and strive to create a greater or less uniformity as its
secure basis.
The first
uniformity from which all the rest takes its start is that of a centralised
government whose natural function is to create and ensure a uniform
administration. A central government is necessary to every aggregate which
seeks to arrive at an organic unity of its political and economic life.
Although, nominally or to begin with, this central government may be only an
organ created by several States that still claim to be sovereign within their
own borders, an instrument to which for convenience' sake they attribute a few
of their powers for common objects, yet in fact it tends always to become
itself the sovereign body and desires always to concentrate more and more power
into its hands and leave only delegated powers to local legislatures and
authorities. The practical inconveniences of a looser system strengthen this
tendency and weaken gradually the force of the safeguards erected against an
encroachment which seems more and more to be entirely beneficial and supported
by the logic of general utility. Even in the United States with its strong
attachment to its original constitution and slowness in accepting
constitutional innovations on other than local lines, the tendency is
manifesting itself and would certainly have resulted by this time in great and
radical changes if there had not been a Supreme Court missioned to nullify any
legislative interference with the original constitution, or if the American
policy of aloofness from foreign affairs and complications had not removed the
pressure of those necessities that in other nations have aided the central
government to engross all real power and convert itself into the source as well
as the head or centre of national activities. The traditional policy of the
United States, its pacificism, its anti-militarism, its aversion to
entanglement in European complications or any close touch with the politics of
Europe, its jealousy of interference by the European Powers in American affairs
in spite of their possession of colonies and interests in the Western
hemisphere, are largely due to the instinct that this separateness is the sole
security for the maintenance of its institutions and the peculiar type of its
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national life. Once militarised, once cast into the
vortex of old-world politics, as it at times threatens to be, nothing could
long protect the States from the necessity of large changes in the direction of
centralisation and the weakening of the federal principle.1 Switzerland
owes the security of its federal constitution to a similarly self-centred neutrality.
For the
growth of national centralisation is due to two primary needs of which the
first and most pressing is the necessity of compactness, single-mindedness, a
single and concentrated action against other nations, whether for defence
against external aggression or for aggression upon others in the pursuit of
national interests and ambitions. The centralising effect of war and
militarism, its call for a concentration of powers, has been a commonplace of
history from the earliest times. It has been the chief factor in the evolution
of centralised and absolute monarchies, in the maintenance of close and
powerful aristocracies, in the welding together of disparate elements and the
discouragement of centrifugal tendencies. The nations which, faced with this
necessity, have failed to evolve or to preserve this concentration of powers,
have always tended to fare ill in the battle of life, even if they have not
shared the fate long endured by Italy and Poland in Europe or by India in Asia.
The strength of centralised Japan, the weakness of ecentralised China was a standing proof that even in modern conditions
the ancient rule holds good. Only yesterday the free States of Western Europe
found themselves compelled to suspend all their hard-earned liberties and go
back to the ancient Roman device of an irresponsible Senate and even to a
covert dictator- ship in order to meet the concentrated strength of a nation
powerfully centralised and organised for military defence and attack. If the
sense of this necessity could covertly or overtly survive the actual duration
of war, there can be no doubt that democracy and liberty would receive the most
dangerous and possibly fatal blow they have yet suffered since their
re-establishment in modern times.2
1 The
Roosevelt policy and the difficulties it encountered illustrate vividly the
power of these two conflicting forces in the United States; and the:
trend towards the strengthening of the federal case, however slow, is
unmistakable.
2 Even as it is, the direction of the drive
of forces tends to be evidently away from democracy towards a more and more
rigid State control and regimentation
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The power
of Prussia to take the life of Germany into its grasp was due almost wholly to
the sense of an insecure position between two great and hostile nations and to
the feeling of encirclement and 'insecurity for its expansion which was imposed
on the Reich by its peculiar placement in Europe. Another example of the same
tendency was the strength which the idea of confederation acquired as a result
of war in England and her colonies. So long as' the colonies could stand aloof
and unaffected by England's wars and foreign policy, this idea had little
chance of effectuation; but the experience of the war and its embarrassments
and the patent inability to compel a concentration of all the potential strength
of the empire under a system of almost total decentralisation seem to have made
inevitable a tightening up of the loose and easy make of the British Empire
which may go very far once the principle has been recognised and put initially
into practice.1 A
loose federation in one form or another serves well where peace is the rule;
wherever peace is insecure or the struggle of life difficult and menacing,
looseness becomes a disadvantage and may turn even into a fatal defect, the opportunity
of fate for destruction. The pressure of peril from without and the need of
expansion create only the tendency towards a strong political and military
centralisation; the growth of uniformity arises from the need of a close
internal organisation of which the centre thus created becomes the instrument.
This organisation is partly called for by the same needs as create the
instrument, but much more by the advantages of uniformity for a well- ordered
social and economic life based upon a convenience of which life is careless,
but which the intelligence of man constantly demands, - a clear, simple and, as
far as the complexity of life will allow, a facile principle of order. The
human intelligence as soon as it begins to order life according to its own
1 As yet this has only gone so far as equality of
status with close consultation in foreign affairs, attempts at a closer
economic co-operation, but a continuation of large wars might either according
to its fortunes dissolve the still loose or compel a more coherent system. At
present, however, this possibility is held back by the arrival of true Dominion
Status and the Westminster Statute which make federation unnecessary for any
practical purpose and even perhaps undesirable for the sentiment in favour of a
practical independence
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fashion and not according to the more instinctively
supple and flexible principle of organic order inherent in life, aims
necessarily at imitating physical Nature in the fixity of her uniform fundamental
principles of arrangement, but tries also to give to them, as much as may be, a
uniform application. It drives at the suppression of all important variations.
It is only when it has enlarged itself and feels more competent to understand
and deal with natural complexities that it finds itself at all at ease managing
what the principle of life seems always to demand, the free variation and
subtly diverse application of uniform principles. First of all in the ordering
of a national society, it aims naturally at uniformity in that aspect of it
which most nearly concerns the particular need of the centre of order which has
been called into existence, its political and military function. It aims first
at a sufficient and then at an absolute unity and uniformity of administration.
The
monarchies which the need of concentration called into being, drove first at a
preliminary concentration, a gathering of the main threads of administration
into the hands of the central authority. We see this everywhere, but the
stages of the process "I are
most clearly indicated in the political history of France; for there the
confusion of feudal separatism and feudal jurisdictions created the most
formidable difficulties, and yet by a constant centralising insistence and a
final violent reaction from their surviving results it was there that they were
most successfully resolved and removed. The centralising monarchy, brought
to supreme power by the repeated lessons of the English invasions, the Spanish
pressure, the civil wars, developed inevitably that absolutism which the great
historic figure of Louis XIV so strikingly personifies. His famous dictum,
"I am the State", expressed really the need felt by the country of
the development of one undisputed sovereign Power which should concentrate in
itself all military, legislative and administrative authority as against the
loose and almost chaotic organisation of feudal France. The system of the
Bourbons aimed first at administrative
centralisation and unity, secondarily at a certain amount of administrative
uniformity. It could not carry this second aim to an entirely successful
conclusion because of its dependence on
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the aristocracy which it had replaced, but to which it
was obliged to leave the confused debris of its feudal privileges. The
Revolution made short work of this aristocracy and swept away the relics of the
ancient system. In establishing a rigorous uniformity it did not reverse but
rather completed the work of the monarchy. An entire unity and uniformity
legislative, fiscal, economic, judicial, social, was the goal towards which
French absolutism, monarchical or democratic, was committed by its original
impulse. The rule of the Jacobins and the regime of Napoleon only brought
rapidly to fruition what was slowly evolving under the monarchy out of the
confused organism of feudal France.
In other
countries the movement was less direct and the survival of old institutions
even after the loss of their original reason for existence more obstinate; but
everywhere in Europe, even in Germany1 and
Russia, the trend has been the same and the eventual result is inevitable. The
study of that evolution is of considerable importance for the future; for the
difficulties to be surmounted were identical in essence, however different in
form and extent to those which would stand in the way of the evolution of a
World-State out of the loose and still confused organism of the modern
civilised world.
1 Note
the absolute culmination of this drive in Germany, in the unprecedented
centralisation, the rigid standardisation and uniformity of the Nationalist
Socialist regime under Hitler .
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